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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 7718a-l and 78-2a-3(e) (1953 as amended).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue presented: Whether the trial court erred in failing to include in its
instructions that the jury be permitted to consider that refusals to do field sobriety tests
and a chemical test may be supported by reasons completely consistent with innocence.
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Standard of Review: Jury instruction issues such as are presented herein and
which are properly objected to are questions of law to be reviewed under a correction of
error standard. State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied, 917
P.2d 556 (Utah 1996); State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Utah App. 1994) cert.
denied, 892 P.2d 12 (Utah 1995

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Amendment V, Constitution of the United States (in pertinent part)
... nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Amendment VI, Constitution of the United States (in pertinent part)
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed.
Amendment XIV, Constitution of the United States (in pertinent part)
Section. 1. ... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.

IV

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JAIME M. LONGORIA,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
OREM CITY,
Case No. 20070218-CA
Plaintiff/Appellee.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Longoria was charged by Orem City with Reckless Driving and
Driving Under the Influence, both class B misdemeanors. R. 5. The case was filed
and prosecuted in the Fourth Judicial District Court before Judge John C.
Backlund. R. 7-8. Mr. Longoria went to trial with original counsel and was
convicted of both counts over prior counsel's objections to two jury instructions
given by the trial court. R. 29-28. (See Factual section below.)
New counsel, counsel herein, filed a Motion for a New Trial based on two
jury instructions complained of by Mr. Longoria. R. 113-89. The City objected to
the new trial. R. 136-126. The trial court granted the Motion for New Trial as to
the DUI count only. R. 144-142; R. 149-145 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law).
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Counsel objected urging the court to vacate the Reckless Driving
Conviction, as well, citing Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. R. 156153. The City opposed the Motion and the trial court denied the Motion. R 162158; R. 175.
Counsel then filed a Motion urging the trial court to dismiss the DUI count
on double jeopardy grounds and Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403, Former prosecution
barring subsequent prosecution for offense out of same episode. R. 185-178. The
City again objected, and the Court denied the Motion to dismiss the DUI count but
reversed its original order on the first motion and ordered Mr. Longoria returned to
the original pre-trial position on both counts; a new trial was scheduled. R. 196193; R. 201-02.
At the new trial on both counts the court prepared new jury instructions
replacing the two which had been the subject of granting the new trial. T. 3-10.
See Addendum A. Counsel objected to the new instructions, urging that while the
offending language had been removed, the court's instructions lacked the
necessary language to assure a fair jury trial and verdict. T. 3-8. The court
overruled the objections and the case proceeded to trial. T. 7-8. Mr. Longoria
again was convicted on both counts. R. 236-37.
Mr. Longoria was sentenced on both counts including a jail term of four
days and a number of other conditions. R. 247-246. He requested a Certificate of
Probable Cause which the court denied. R. 258-256; R. 260. This appeal
followed.
2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Two jury instructions given by the court in the original trial contained
language instructing the jury that under the law the refusal to submit to field
sobriety tests (first trial instruction no. 10—see Addendum C), and the refusal to
submit to a chemical breath test (first trial instruction no. 13—see Addendum D),
both indicated the Defendant's consciousness of guilt. On the Motion for New
Trial Mr. Longoria complained that the instructions had compromised a fair jury
verdict because (1) of the presence of he consciousness of guilt language creating
a presumption of guilt thereby shifting the burden of proof to the Defendant, and
(2) the lack of language elucidating that the refusal to submit to field sobriety tests
and a chemical test may be choices consistent with innocence.
The Motion for a New Trial eventually was granted over the City's
objection (as explained in the Statement of the Case) and the trial court prepared
and gave new instructions to the jury. T. 1-10. The new instructions drafted by
the court for the second trial, now numbered instructions 8 and 9, removed "the
consciousness of guilt" language, but did not include the requested language that
the jury was permitted to find that the reasons for a refusal of both field sobriety
tests and a requested chemical test may be supported by reasons consistent with
innocence. Id. Mr. Longoria objected to the two replacement instructions, as he
had in the Motion for a New Trial, urging here that despite the court's removal of
the offending "consciousness of guilt" language, the instructions lacked the critical
3

language, and more essential language, which permitted the jury to consider that
the refusals may be supported by reasons completely consistent with innocence.
T. 4-7.
In fact, counsel had submitted replacement instructions for both the field
sobriety tests refusals and the chemical test refusals which the court refused to
give, noted the objection, stated they would not be given and indicated the
instructions would be endorsed as rejected and made part of the record. T. 5-8.
Notably, the court did comment to counsel that even counsel's proffered
instruction maintained the "consciousness of guilt" language which the court
claimed was the basis of the new trial and not the "reasons consistent with
innocence" language. T. 5. Counsel disagreed and asked for a record to be made
of his objection. T. 5-7.
The record of the Defense Motion for a New Trial demonstrates that
counsel complained of the consciousness of guilt language and proffered the Utah
Supreme Court's language from State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573 (Utah 1983), noting
the important inclusion of language indicating that there may be reasons for
refusing to submit to filed sobriety tests or a chemical test fully consistent with
innocence and that even if consciousness of guilt is inferred from flight it does not
necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime charged. R. 105-103.
The trial court's Conclusions of Law signed by the Court, and un-objected
to by the City, likewise support that the granting of the new trial for both reasons:
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3. Jury Instructions 10 & 13 were improper based on their lack of
language advising the jury that there may be reasons for refusing the field
sobriety tests or chemical tests fully consistent with innocence and that
even if consciousness of guilt is inferred from the Defendant's refusal to
submit to field sobriety test [or] his refusal to submit to a chemical test,
such evidence does not reflect actual guilt of the crime charged.
R. 148.
The instructions drafted and given to the jury by the courting the second
trial, numbers 8 and 9, did not contain consciousness of guilt language but they
also lacked the "there may be reasons for refusing the field sobriety tests or
chemical tests fully consistent with innocence" language. Instructions 8 and 9 are
provided in Addenda E and F, respectively.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
After granting Mr. Longoria a new trial due to improper jury instruction
which impermissibly shifted the burden to the Defendant to prove his innocence,
the trial court only partially repaired the flawed instructions. The given
instructions during the second trial failed to instruct the jury that the choices of
Mr. Longoria to refuse field sobriety tests and the chemical test may have been
based on reason consistent with innocence. Without that language, the instruction
remained violative of his due process rights and rights to a fair trial by an impartial
jury.
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPROPRIATELY INSTRUCT
THE JURY THAT REFUSALS TO DO FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS
AND A CHEMICAL TEST MAY BE SUPPORTED BY REASONS
COMPLETELY CONSISTENT WITH INNOCENCE.

In order to convict a Defendant of Driving Under the Influence the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant had a blood
alcohol content of .08 or greater as shown by a chemical test or that the Defendant
was under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of alcohol and drugs
to a degree that rendered him incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle. Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-502. In the present case, due to the fact that there was not an
admissible chemical test, the City conceded that the only theory under which the
Defendant could be convicted of DUI was that the Defendant had operated a
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or combination thereof, to
such a degree that the Defendant could not safely drive a vehicle. (See Jury
Instruction # 5, R. 231.)
The Jury Instructions at issue here involve the Defendant's refusal to
perform requested field sobriety tests and his refusal to submit to a chemical test.
Specifically, the issue before this Court focuses on the trial court's instructions to
the jury regarding the manner in which the jury should consider evidence of the
two refusals.
Mr. Longoria sought and received a new trial due to the trial courts
incorrect jury instructions during the first trial. At the second trial, Mr. Longoria
6

contends that the court again erred in instructing the jury, particularly by giving
jury instructions number 8 and number 9 over his objection. Addenda

and

. The improper jury instructions given by the court permitted a shift in the
burden of proof to the Defendant and resulted in substantial adverse effects on the
rights of the defendant to due process of law, a fair jury trial, and ultimately a fair
verdict entered by a properly instructed jury based on the appropriate law. Mr.
Longoria insists that had appropriate instructions been given, the jury would likely
have reached a different verdict.

Refusal to Submit to Field Sobriety Tests
It is undisputed that Mr. Longoria did not perform field sobriety tests in this
case. However, what is disputed is whether the Court properly instructed the jury
on whether and how they can consider evidence that the Defendant did not
perform the field sobriety tests as requested by the officer.

The instruction given

in the first trial read as follows:
Instruction #10 [first trial]
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO FIELD SOBRIETY TEST. You are
instructed that under the law the refusal to submit to a field sobriety tests is
best described as conduct indicating a consciousness of guilt.
R.46.
After motions and argument by counsel, the trial court recognized the
prejudicial error contained in this instruction and granted a new trial. In that new
trial the court drafted and gave this instruction in place of the above instruction.
7

Instruction No. 9 [the new trial]
The Defendant is not required, by law, to submit to the officer's request to
perform field sobriety tests; however, you may take notice of and give
whatever weight you determine to the fact that the defendant refused to
perform any field sobriety tests.
R. 227. Absent from the instruction is language permitting the jury to find reasons
consistent with innocence as the basis for the refusals.
Under Utah law it is neither a criminal offense nor otherwise unlawful to
refuse to perform field sobriety tests. Most traffic stops involving suspected drunk
drivers likely result in the arresting officer requesting that the driver perform field
sobriety tests; however, there is no legal or statutory obligation requiring that a
driver submit to field sobriety tests. Similarly, neither is there any requirement
that a police officer require an arrested person to perform field sobriety tests
before arresting a driver for DUI. In fact, in many cases the arresting officer does
not request that the driver submit to field sobriety tests before placing the driver
under arrest for a DUI. In those cases the absence of field sobriety tests certainly
does not prevent the driver from being arrested or prosecuted. Field sobriety tests
are simply a tool which an officer can use at his or her discretion to gather
evidence in investigating a suspected drunk driving offense.

Refusal to Submit to Chemical Test
It is also undisputed that Mr. Longoria did not submit to a chemical test to
determine the blood alcohol content of his breath or blood. However what is
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disputed is whether the Court properly instructed the jury on whether and how
they can consider evidence that the Defendant refused to submit to a chemical test
as requested by the officer. Again, in the first trial the court instructed as follows:
Instruction No. 13 [first trial]
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO BREATH TEST. You are instructed that
under the law the refusal of a person to submit to a chemical breath test is
best described as conduct indicating a consciousness of guilt.
R. 43. The replacement instruction was give as follows:
Instruction No. 8 [the new trial]
You are instructed that under Utah law a person operating a motor
vehicle in this State is considered to have given consent to a chemical test
or tests of his breath, blood or urine for the purpose of determining whether
he/she was operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or a combination thereof.
When an officer arrests a person for Driving Under the Influence of
Alcohol and/or Drugs, the officer may request the person to submit to a test
of his breath, blood or urine to determine the person's blood or breath
alcohol level.
You may take notice of and give whatever weight you determine to
the Defendant's refusal to submit to the blood or breath test requested by
the officer, just as you may weigh and consider any evidence presented to
you.
R. 228.
Under Utah law it is not a crime to refuse to submit to a chemical test;
however, pursuant to Utah's Implied Consent Law, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-520,
a driver who refuses to submit to chemical test may suffer a suspension of his
driving privileges for a period of 18 to 24 months and may be restricted from
operating a vehicle with any amount of alcohol in his system for 5 to 10 years.
Furthermore, although Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-524 states that "If a person under
9

arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or any additional test under
Section 41-6a-520, evidence of any refusal is admissible in any civil or criminal
action or proceedings" resulting from the arrest for DUI, the statute contains no
language regarding a presumption of guilt or a presumption that the defendant's
refusal is evidence of a consciousness of guilt.

ANALYSIS
Both new instructions, as noted, removed the "consciousness of guilt"
language but erroneously failed to clarify that there may be innocent reasons why
a Defendant might refuse field sobriety tests and/or a chemical test. The
importance of this missing language is apparent in other jury instruction decisions.
In State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court was
asked to rule on the propriety of a flight instruction analogous to our situation
here. The instruction at issue in Bales read as follows:
The flight or attempted flight of a person immediately after the
commission of a crime or after he is accused of a crime that has been
committed, is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact
which, if proven, may be considered by you in the light of all other proven
facts in deciding the question of his guilt or innocence. The weight to
which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine.
You are further instructed that flight affords a basis for an inference of
consciousness of guilt and constitutes an implied admission.
State v. Bales. 675 P.2d 573, 574 (Utah 1983).
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Although the Utah Supreme Court found that the first paragraph of this
instruction was acceptable, the Court found that the language of the second
paragraph to be improper. The Court opined:
We are also persuaded that the first paragraph of the flight instruction
given in this case was acceptable in view of the evidence. It should,
however, have incorporated two further ideas. A flight instruction will not
be completely free from criticism unless it advises the jury that there may
be reasons for flight fully consistent with innocence and that even if
consciousness of guilt is inferred from flight it does not necessarily reflect
actual guilt of the crime charged.
In contrast, we can find no justification for the second paragraph of the
flight instruction given to the jury in this case. Indeed, the State does not
even attempt to justify it. So far as we have been able to determine, the
idea that flight constitutes an "implied admission" of guilt is not supported
by any federal or state decision or by any of the analysis justifying flight
instructions.

Id. at 575-76 (emphasis added).
Likewise, in State v.Robichaux, 639 P.2d 207 (Utah 198Inciting
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)), the Court reversed a conviction and
explained that instructions capable of interpretation by the jury as being
mandatory or conclusive are violative of the burden of proof standard and the
presumption of innocence. The irregularity in the instruction used in Robichaux
warranting reversal was that the instruction there assisted the jury to find as a
matter of law that the intent element had been established which impermissibly
shifted the burden to the defendant. Id. at 210.
This Court has also reviewed burden shifting instructions. In State v.
Howland. 761 P.2d 579 (Utah App 1988), this Court reversed a conviction in a
11

flight instruction case where the flight occurred before the commission of the
crime. This Court noted:
Even if the evidence had supported the giving of this flight instruction, the
trial judge should also have advised the jury that (1) there may be reasons
for flight fully consistent with innocence, and (2) even if consciousness of
guilt is inferred from flight it does not necessarily reflect actual guilt of the
crime charged.
Id. at 580 n. 1 (citing Bales, 675 P.2d at 575).
Although the language of the instruction at issue in Bales and the language
used in the instructions in this case are not identical, the language that "under the
law" and a failure to clarify that reasons for the refusals may be consistent with
innocence have the same affect as the "implied admission" the Utah Supreme
Court found improper in Bales. A reasonable juror could certainly interpret the
language utilized by the court to mean that if they find that the Defendant refused
to submit to field sobriety tests or refused to submit to a chemical test, that his
refusals must be regarded as a presumption or an admission of guilt.
While the trial court eliminated part of the problems with the first trial's
jury instructions (consciousness of guilt), the second, (that there may be reasons
for refusing to submit to filed sobriety tests or a chemical test fully consistent with
innocence), and perhaps more important aspect of the offending instructions, was
not repaired. The replacement instructions, without the language, shifted the
burden to the Mr. Longoria by directing the jury that under the law the
Defendant's refusals were evidence of guilt.
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CONCLUSION
As the court is aware an admission of guilt by a Defendant is one of the
most compelling pieces of evidence that can be introduced in a criminal case.
Likewise, an implied admission of guilt has a similar affect. The prosecution's
case focused around the Mr. Longoria's refusal to perform field sobriety tests and
his refusal to submit to a chemical test and the presumption that these refusals
established his guilt. As such, the impact of the improper jury instructions had on
this case was substantial; and absent these improper instructions, the jury's verdict
would have been different.
Mr. Longoria's due process rights and his right to have a fair and impartial
jury trial were denied when the court erred by giving the improper jury
instructions numbers 8 and 9.
THEREFORE, the Mr. Longoria respectfully requests that this Court find
that at the second trial in this matter there was an error or impropriety which had a
substantial adverse effect upon his rights to due process and a fair and impartial
jury trial meriting the convictions be reversed and a decision entered granting a
new trial in this matter.
DATED thisQ_ day of October, 2007.

JASON SCHATZ
Attorney for Appellant

13

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, Jason Schatz, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered the
original and seven copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 450 South State, 5th Floor, P. O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114-0230, and two copies of the Brief to be mailed, postage prepaid to Robert
Church, Orem City Attorney, 56 N. State Street, Orem, Utah 84057, this , 5
day of October, 2007.

JASON SCHATZ (# 9969)
Attorney for Appellant

I hand delivered the copies of the Brief to the Utah Court of Appeals and
mailed copies to the Orem City Attorney's Office as indicated above this
day of October, 2007.

14

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT -4TQR3SM' ,QQnRY^

1

o i.A i L - L,7V
i »H

17AM '-L "
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2

O J'l 21 A 10 Cb

3
4

OREM CITY,

5
6
7

JURY TRIAL
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT
PLAINTIFF,

VS.

JAIME M. LONGORIA,

CASE
#055210298
APPEAL #20070218-CA

8
DEFENDANT.

JUDGE JOHN C. BACKLUND

9
10
1 1

BE IT REMEMBERED
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counsel, the following proceedings were held:
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1

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2

(December 18, 2006 - Partial Transcript)

3
4
5
6
7

THE JUDGE:

The first instruction is the basic

stock instruction, introductory instruction.
Number two defines evidence, direct and
circumstantial.
Number three speaks about statements and arguments

8

by, made by the attorneys, offers of evidence.

9

much stock.

It's pretty

10

Number four is the credibility instruction.

11

Number five is the elements instruction for driving

12

under the influence and instructs them if they don't find all

13

of the elements they must find the defendant not guilty, and

14

if they do beyond a reasonable doubt they must find the

15

defendant guilty.

16

Number six says not every person that's consume an

17

alcoholic beverage and then drives a vehicle is guilty of

18

driving under the influence of alcohol to a degree to such

19

person is rendered incapable of safely driving a vehicle.

20

On the other hand, it is not necessary that a person be

21

intoxicated or, to be under the influence.

22

defines what that means to be impaired.

23

And then it

The next one says under the influence, covers not

24

only the well-known and easily recognized conditions and

25

degrees of intoxication but covers any perceptible abnormal

COURT PROCEEDINGS
PAGF 1

1

mental or physical condition.

And then it says the city is

2

not bound to prove the defendant was drunk or intoxicated but

3

was driving under the influence, the person had consumed

4

alcohol to a degree that rendered him incapable of safely

5

driving a vehicle.
The next one talks about the chemical tests.

6

You

7

are instructed under Utah law a person operating a motor

8

vehicle in this state is considered to have given consent to

9

a chemical test or test of his breath, blood or urine for

10

purposes of determining whether he or she was operating or in

11

actual physical control of a motor vehicle under the

12

influence of alcohol, any drug or combination thereof.
When an officer arrests a person for driving under

13
14

the influence of alcohol and/or drugs the officer may request

15

the person to submit to a test of his breath, blood or urine

16

to determine the person's blood or alcohol, breath alcohol

17

level.

18

You may take notice of and give whatever weight

19

you determine to the defendant's refusal to submit to the

20

blood or breath test requested by the officer, just as you

21

may weigh and consider any evidence presented to you.

22
23
24
25

So it's neither one of your instructions, it's one
I had drafted.
MR. SCHATZ:

Your Honor, I find that to be flawed

and the reason it is is because it doesn't include the

COURT PROCEEDINGS
D»r.n A

1

language about other reasons for refusal that are also

2

consistent with innocence.

3

that obviously we argued about.

4

instructions cases that I've found dealing with flight and so

5

on required that explanation that there may also be reasons

6

that are completely consistent with innocence.

7

specific language is what the whole motion for a new trial

8

was all about.
THE JUDGE:

9
10

No.

That, that was one of the things
And all of the jury

I mean, that

Your motion really went to that

refusal to submit to the chemical test shows a consciousness

1 1 of guilt.

That was your big objection.

12

MR. SCHATZ:

Best characterized—

13

THE JUDGE:

Was best characterized as a

14

consciousness of guilt s o —

15

MR. SCHATZ:

NO.

16

THE JUDGE:

So that, in fact that's in your

17

proffer instruction, consciousness of guilt, and I've

18

eliminated that entirely.

19

What other reason besides asserting his

20

constitutional right against self-incrimination would this

21

defendant have for not submitting to the test, or in the

22

alternative that he didn't want them to know what his blood

23

or breath alcohol content level was?

24
25

MR. SCHATZ:

I would just like the record to

note, I mean, certainly the court is going to decide whether

COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1

or not that's going to be included, but I would like the

2

record to note that I do object to the instruction if it

3

doesn't contain that specific statement regarding, you know,

4

that can be consistent with innocence.

5

language was included in, in why we granted the motion for

6

a new trial, and all of the case law that I provided.

7

I just

I think that specific

So

want it noted on the record that if it's not

included—
THE JUDGE:
10

I, I thought the a, argument for the

new trial was the consciousness of guilt thing, not that

1 1 there are other reasons consistent with innocence to not take
12

the chemical test.

13

what they would be.

For the life of me I can't figure out

14

MR. SCHATZ:

Well, I think that's—

15

THE JUDGE:

What would be consistent with

16
17
18
19
20

innocence in not taking—
MR. SCHATZ:

Exercising your rights, being upset

with the officer, I mean, I think—
THE JUDGE:

Being upset with the officer is

consistent with innocence?

21

MR. SCHATZ:

22

THE JUDGE:

Sure.

I mean I guess my, m y —

I guess it's a reason.

23

it's consistent with innocence or guilt.

24

consistent with anything.

25

MR. SCHATZ:

I don't think

It's not

My objection, Your Honor, just so

COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1

it's noted on the record—

2

THE JUDGE:

Right.

3

MR. SCHATZ:

—

4

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

5

MR. SCHATZ:

—

6
7

is with the language—

specifically that it doesn't

contain that because I think it has to.
THE JUDGE:

Thank you.

The next instruction says

8

the defendant is not required by law to submit to the

9

officer's request to perform field sobriety tests, however,

10

you may take notice of and give whatever weight you determine

1 1 to the fact that the defendant refused to perform any field
12
13

sobriety tests.
MR. SCHATZ:

Your Honor, and for the benefit of

14

the record I have the same objection.

I've submitted an

15

instruction that also includes the innocence language that I

16

think would be appropriate for an instruction such as this.

17

So if the court could just make sure that the record notes

18

that I object to this instruction and have submitted what I

19

believe to be an appropriate instruction including the

20

innocence language as well.

21

THE JUDGE:

All right.

22

MR. SCHATZ:

I don't know if we can mark these to

23
24
25

be put in the file specifically as the ones I submitted.
THE JUDGE:

Yes.

objected to, not given.

You can, you can write on there

I have to endorse on each one of

COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1

these why I gave it over your objection.

2

record of that.

So we'll make a

3

You know, we could actually print something as long

4

as the bible to read to this jury on the instructions, and it

5

could be 50 or 60 pages if we go over every possible

6

scenario.

7

jury needs a straightforward statement of the law.

8

to the jury that he's not required by law to submit to the

9

officer's request to perform the field sobriety tests.

10

stated reason to Officer Laney was I don't have to take

11

those.

12

required by the law to take your field sobriety tests and

13

I'm not going to.

14

that he isn't required by law to admit to that, but they can

15

consider that.

16

that.

I don't think that's necessary.

So I think that's consistent.

I think the
It says

His

He says I'm not

And I tell the jury in the instruction

So okay.

I guess we choose to disagree on

The next instruction is the offense of reckless

17
18

driving containing the a, the elements of that.

19

the city, I'm trying to understand—

20

MR. PETERSON:

21

THE JUDGE:

And so is

Yes.

You don't include within this that he,

22

all you're going on is that it was three or more moving

23

violations within a single continuous act, period of

24

driving?

25

wanton disregard?

So you're not alleging that he drove in willful and

COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1
2

MR. PETERSON:

For strategic reasons I think

it's just simpler t o —

3

THE JUDGE:

4

MR. PETERSON:

5

No.

All right.
—

stick with (short inaudible,

no mic).

6

THE JUDGE:

All right.

So that's, and then so

7

I'11 take out the next one that says willful and wanton

8

disregard since that doesn't apply.

9

next one that talks about a definition of willful disregard

10

since that doesn't apply.

11

person acts willfully.

12

And I'll take out the

And then we need to remove a

So the next instruction a, is the elements

13

instruction, I suppose, for speeding which is a component of

14

the three or more moving violations.

15
16

And then the one after that is the, the component
of failure to stop for a stop sign.

17
18

And the one following that is failure to maintain a
single lane of travel.

19

All right.

Then we come to the instruction after

20

that which depends on whether or not Mr. Longoria is going to

21

testify.

22

going to testify, I've got one here.

23

testify the competent witness in his own on behalf

24

instruction, s o —

25

So I can either give an instruction that he's not

MR. SCHATZ:

If he is going to

And, Your Honor, I think we need a

COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1

few more minutes to discuss that before we make a final

2

determination.

3

THE JUDGE:

4

reasonable doubt instruction.

5
6

said or done.
Jury consult with one another, blank form of
verdict, and then the two verdict forms.

9
10

And then we have the

The court has not intended by anything which it has

7
8

Okay.

So other than those two instructions do you have
any objections about them?

Or any other requests?

Except

1 1 for whether he testifies or not.
12
13

Do you want to go...

Would you make two copies of

that please so that we're, we can go either way.

14

All right.

Well, we'll take a recess.

The jury

15

is eating their dinner so that'll take, you know, maybe 10

16

more minutes.

17

jury in to find out if Mr. Longoria is going to testify or

18

not.

And then I'll come in before we bring the

19

MR. SCHATZ:

20

THE JUDGE:

21
22
23

Thank you, Your Honor.
Thank you.

(Recording turned off)
WHEREUPON, the portion of the hearing requested
transcribed was concluded.

24
25
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ADDENDUM B

FILED

Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

Jason Schatz (Bar #9969)
Schatz & Anderson, LLC
Attorneys for Defendant
356 E. 900 S.
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Phone (801) 746-0447
Fax (801) 579-0606

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

OREM CITY,

:
Plaintiff,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL

v.

:

JAIME LONGORIA,

:

CASE # 055210298

:

JUDGE BACKLUND

Defendant.

The above entitled matter came before this court for hearing on the Defendant's Motion
for New Trial on May 10, 2006. The Plaintiff, Orem City, was present and represented by Orem
City Attorney, Mike Barker. The Defendant was present and represented by his attorne>. Jason
Schatz.
In his Motion for New Trial, the Defendant moved the court to grant a new trial in this
matter on the grounds that the jury was provided with improper instructions regarding the
Defendant's refusal to submit to field sobriety tests and refusal to submit to a chemical test. IN
particular, the Defendant challenged the propriety of Jury Instructions 10 & 13 as provide to the
jury on the day of trial.
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FINDINGS OF FACT

After having reviewed the documents and exhibits and hearing argument from counsel
for both parties, the court finds that:

1.

The Defendant raised proper objections to Jury Instructions 10 & 13 at the time fo
trial.

2.

The Defendant refused to submit to field sobriety tests prior to his arrest and he
refused to submit to a chemical test after his arrest. The jury was given
instructions 10 & 13 regarding the defendant's refusal to submit to field sobriety
tests and his refusal to submit to a chemical test, over defense counsel's objection.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based on the Court's Findings of Fact the court hereby makes the following
Conclusions of Law:

1.

In light of the rulings of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573

(Utah 1983) and State v. Robichaux, 639 P.2d 207(Utah 1981), the Utah Court of
Appeals in State v. Riggs, 987 P.2d 1281(Utah App.,1999) as well as the United States
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F.2d 514,
(C.A.Cal, 1969), Jury Instructions 10 & 13 as provided to the jury in this case were not
proper instruction under Utah law.
2
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2.

Jury Instructions 10 & 13 created an improper presumption of guilt based on the

Defendant's refusal to submit to field sobriety tests and the refusal to submit to a
chemical test.

3.

Jury Instructions 10 & 13 were improper based on their lack of language advising

the jury that there may be reasons for refusing the filed sobriety tests or chemical tests
fully consistent with innocence and that even if consciousness of guilt is inferred from the
Defendant's refusal to submit to filed sobriety test of his refusal to submit to a chemical
test, such evidence does not reflect actual guilt of the crime charged.

4.

The Court's failure to properly instruct the jury had a prejudicial affect on the

Defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury trial. Absent the improper jury instructions
the jury's verdict with regard to the charge of DUI may likely have resulted in a verdict
more favorable to the Defendant.

ORDER

THEREFORE after having fully considered the caselaw and arguments presented by both
parties, and based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth above, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion for New trial is granted with regard to Count
1, Driving Under the Influence. As such, the Defendant's conviction and sentence on Count 1,
Driving Under the Influence is hereby vacated and this matter is set for a new trial on Count 1

00147

only. The Defendant's conviction on Count 2, Reckless Driving stands as well as the sentence
imposed on Count 2, Reckless Driving.

DATED this

/? day of.

/***

., 2006.
BY THE COURT:

JUDGE/BACKLUND
Fourtn District Court

Approved as to form:

MIKE BARKER
OREM CITY ATTORNEY
Attorney for Plaintiff

4

(A

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this day, May 16, 2006,1 personally mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Motion for New Trial to the
following:
Judge Backlund
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
97 E. Center St.
Orem, UT 84057
Mike Barker
OREM CITY ATTORNEY
56 N. State St.
Orem, UT 84057
Jaime Longoria
68 E. 200 N., Apt. # 2
Salt Lake City, UT 84103

/
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ADDENDUM C

INSTRUCTION NO.

\0

REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO FIELD SOBRIETY TEST. You are instructed that under
the law the refusal of a person to submit to a field sobriety tests is best described as conduct
indicating a consciousness of guilt.

00046

ADDENDUM D

INSTRUCTION NO. ) 3
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO BREATH TEST. You are instructed that under the law the
refusal of a person to submit to a chemical breath test is best described as conduct indicating a
consciousness of guilt.
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ADDENDUM E

INSTRUCTION NO. _^
You are instructed that under Utah law a person operating a motor vehicle in this State is
considered to have given consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the
purpose of determining whether he/she was operating or in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or a combination thereof.
When an officer arrests a person for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or
Drugs, the officer may request the person to submit to a test of his breath, blood or urine to
determine the person's blood or breath alcohol level.
You may take notice of and give whatever weight you determine to the Defendant's
refusal to submit to the blood or breath test requested by the officer, just as you may weigh and
consider any evidence presented to you.
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ADDENDUM F

INSTRUCTION NO.

1

The Defendant is not required, by law, to submit to the officer's request to perform field
sobriety tests; however, you may take notice of and give whatever weight you determine to the
fact that the defendant refused to perform any field sobriety tests.
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